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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this thesis is to address the central challenge in
State Emotion discourse: to theorize the processes that turn
individual emotions collective, social, public, and, thus, political.
To do so, I will provide an ontological justification for collective
emotion at the state level, explaining how these emotions can
influence decisions and providing a model for IR scholars to
determine the extent of State Emotion’s influence under particular
circumstances.
My hypothesis proposes that the existence and function of
State Emotion is not from the aggregation of individuals; rather, it
is a structural process. This is established through two premises;
first, that accepting institutionalized states as distributed networks
and emotion as a causally emergent characteristic of intrinsic
experience are fundamental components to establishing the
ontology of State Emotion, and second, that conjoining the
processes of experience with feelings allows for a more explicit
theoretical methodology regarding the political function of State
Emotion. It is with this intent that I bring Tononi’s Integrated
Information Theory of consciousness into the discussion and
formulate my own theory of State Feeling.
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1INTRODUCTION
Whether it’s been Death, Justice, or Mother Nature, societies have been using
personification to convey prominent concepts for thousands of years. Personification has
proven to be a useful tool by presenting abstract concepts in a form that provides an ease of
understanding and by creating metaphors that allow the logic behind particular interactions
to become more apparent. This is no less true in international relations theory, where most
fundamental state behaviors are explained by anthropomorphizing states; they can fear their
neighbors, desire more resources, or befriend a former enemy. However, while
personification may be an insightful literary tool, there is concern when the theories political
scientists weave using these references become the primary attributes of states in serious
analyses, especially when these references are not intended to convey the true nuances
behind state behaviors.
Most international relations scholars use personification as a convenient theoretical
method to illustrate their theories on state agency, yet simultaneously reject the idea that a
state could possibly possess intentionality in reality.1 Such theorists adhere to the
mainstream physicalist and reductionist perspectives in IR; culminating into the common
belief that, although a state can appear to exhibit certain behaviors, it is nothing more than a
collection of individuals sharing the same emotions and intentions. Howbeit, few theorists
reject the application of intentionality in descriptive IR literature, despite disagreeing with
1 Barkin, J. Samuel. Realist Constructivism. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2010.
2the ontological notion of the state as an agent itself. This is due to its effective explanatory
capabilities in predicting state behavior.2 If we are to accept these perspectives in IR, it
ought to at least be possible, if not more effective, to analytically reduce states to the
individual level where the actual emotions and intentions are contained within physical
bodies and only accessible to the politicians running the state when expressed by the
majority of the population.
Conversely, this is often not the case when examining state-level decision-making. IR
theorists have struggled to universally predict intentions solely based on the individual
components within a state, which is necessary to reduce the state from a whole entity in
analysis.3 Scholars of foreign policy recognize the need to identify nuances in state behavior
through individuals, using the psycho-analysis of specific leaders and applying leader
stereotypes to particular decisions. This has proven to be beneficial in determining many
theories on why states deviate from rational actor paradigms, which have often stumped
many IR theorists.4 Nonetheless, these analyses do not directly reflect state behavior, but
rather the leader behavior often provides the reason behind it; this assumption carries
limitations when associating public opinion and social structures, particularly in times of
upheaval, directly to the decisions of the state. For this reason, the personification of states is
essential to the fundamentals of almost every camp in IR theory; and, as Alexander Wendt
argues, the necessity of this practice suggests that it is more than a mere shorthand for actual
processes.5
Recently there has been a turn of focus onto the collective emotion of the populace as an
2 Wendt, Alexander. “The state as person in international theory.” Review of International Studies, 30 (2004): 289-316.
3 Barkin, J. Samuel. Realist Constructivism. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2010.
4 Hill, Christopher. The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy. Houndmills: Palgrave, 2003.
5 Wendt, Alexander. “The state as person in international theory.” Review of International Studies, 30 (2004): 289-316.
3explanation of why states make ‘irrational’ decisions, being influenced by what many IR
scholars call “State Emotion.” This concept has been explored through the emerging
discourse initiated by Jonathan Mercer (2006) and Neta Crawford (2000). The study of
collective emotions is not unique to political science; fields such as psychology and
philosophy have entertained the idea for quite some time. Scholars in these fields, in
addition to some in political science, have observed that collective emotion often has
irreducible properties, in that everyone within a group does not necessarily have to share the
same exact emotion for the emotion to become collective,6 and not necessarily all emotions,
even those that are shared between every member of the group, become collectively
accessible.7 Conclusively, collective emotion is hardly quantifiable through the analysis of
individual members. Thus the collective emotions that most IR theorists assert have
significant influence over state-level decision-making do not follow the same reductionist
framework that implicitly drives empirical political analysis. The implications behind
observing this non-reductionist behavior in a supposedly reductionist world suggest that the
entire notion needs to be challenged, and necessitates an alternative methodology for future
empirical inquiries.
State Emotion research has the capacity to challenge this notion, offering the potential to
resolve many disputes between IR theorists and explain elusive political phenomena. By
suggesting that a state entity could possess emotion and intentions, the personification of
states becomes a reasonable strategy to model state behavior. The implications of State
Emotion would additionally contribute to the agent-structure debate by providing an
ontological reason for why a structure could exhibit intention and agency, perhaps allowing
6 List and Pettit. “GroupAgency and Supervenience.” Southern Journal of Philosophy, XLIV (2006): 85-105.
7 Echterhoff, Gerald, E. Tory Higgins, and John M. Levine. "Shared reality experiencing commonality with others' inner
states about the world." Perspectives on Psychological Science 4, no. 5 (2009): 496-521
4for some states to qualify as “psychological persons” under frameworks that require
experience as a part of agency.8
Even within State Emotion discourse, though, there are central disagreements that serve
as obstacles to using State Emotion for solvency. Many of the theorists who support the
concept of State Emotion differ significantly in their explanations of how emotions can exist
outside of an individual, the reducibility of a State Emotion, and how the necessity of
interpretation affects the salience of individual emotions within the collective. Critics of
State Emotion wield these fundamental disagreements as evidence of a physicalist reality,
alternatively suggesting that political scientists are merely observing individuals
empathizing with their group identities fully created within the confines of their own minds.
This is why Bleiker and Hutchison have asserted that “the most important challenge in
political research on emotions, or at least the one that precedes all others: to theorize the
processes that turn individual emotions collective, social, public, and, thus, political.”9
This challenge captures the two central issues for implementing State Emotion into
International Relations Theory: the lack of an ontological foundation for macro-level
analyses and the lack of a consistent methodology in micro-level applications. In order to
validate the influence of State Emotions, theorists must address the process of individual
emotions becoming collective emotions. As Brent Sasley asserts, “more explicit propositions
about individual-to-group emotions transference will help make theorizing about states’ (or
other group actors’) emotions more rigorous.”10 A number of factors go into these processes,
such as the links between people that make emotions salient in one group rather than another
8 Wendt, Alexander. “The state as person in international theory.” Review of International Studies, 30 (2004): 289-316.
9 Hutchison, Emma, and Roland Bleiker. "Theorizing emotions in world politics." International Theory 6, no. 03 (2014):
491-514.
10 Sasley, Brent E. "Theorizing States’ Emotions." International Studies Review. 13, no. 3 (2011): 452-476
5and whether the group emotion itself is merely a reflection of individual emotions or
aggregated superveniently. Once its existence has been validated, theorists must also
establish a methodology for theorizing the extent to which State Emotion becomes a
determinant of state behavior - namely, to posit the circumstances that collective emotions
manifest themselves into state-level decision-making.
The purpose of this thesis is to address these central issues in an effort to answer Bleiker
and Hutchison's challenge: to theorize the processes that turn individual emotions collective,
social, public, and , thus, political. To do so, I will provide an ontological justification for
collective emotion at the state level, explaining how these emotions are manifested in
state-decisions and providing a model for IR scholars to determine the extent of State
Emotion’s influence under particular circumstances.
My hypothesis proposes that the existence and function of State Emotion is not from the
aggregation of individuals; rather, it is a structural process. This is established through two
premises; first, that accepting institutionalized states as distributed networks and emotion as
a causally emergent characteristic of intrinsic experience are fundamental components to
establishing the ontology of State Emotion, and second, that conjoining the processes of
experience with feelings allows for more explicit theorizing regarding the political function
of State Emotion. It is with this intent that I bring Giulio Tononi’s Integrated Information
Theory of consciousness (IIT) into the discussion and formulate my own theory of State
Feeling. To test this hypothesis, I will look at the background of the pertinent theories at
hand, reflect on the considerations for solvency, apply the Integrated Information Theory to
institutionalized states, and reflect on the implications, concluding with an outlook for future
research.
6TheAnalytical Road Map
First, after briefly discussing the present discourse in the relatively new field of State
Emotion, my argument will reflect on the prominent disputes that are the current obstacles to
establishing an ontology. Then I will introduce IIT as a framework, elaborating on the nature
of this theory to frame my future arguments.
Several considerations regarding the application of IIT follow: first, I will introduce
how neuroscience has been applied to international relations theory, providing a precedent to
follow as well as insights on the potential overuse of such theories. Then I focus on the
applicability of IIT specifically, demonstrating how IIT does not carry many of the same
pitfalls as other neuroscientific theories in IR. Since IIT calculates grades of experience
rather than emotion, I subsequently explain the relevancy of experience to the formation of
State Emotion. I will introduce the concept of State Feeling to offer additional insight in
regards to this formation and additional analytical contexts. The final consideration will
reflect the ways that the nature of IIT offers unique solvency apart from other neuroscientific
theories to the prominent disputes of State Emotion discourse. By overcoming the common
obstacles to ontology, I can proceed with confidence in its application to State Emotion.
After describing my methodology for applying IIT, I will define the fundamental axioms
that enable IIT to work on the neural level. I will then move to the postulates, which are the
analytical basis for attributing experience to certain entities while denying it to others.
During the process of applying the postulates, I will refer to analogies at the state-level as
well as existing social theories for additional justification. I will begin with the two
postulates that are non-specialized and equally relevant to both mechanisms and systems;
then I will move on to the next three postulates separately as they uniquely apply to the
7mechanisms and the system. The Exclusion postulate poses a unique challenge to applying
the theory to collectives and states; I respond by explaining the faults of the postulate’s
assertions before presenting my case for why institutionalized states can meet a more
flexible interpretation of this postulate.
After a full examination of the complexities behind IIT, I will reflect on the implications
of its application to the ontology of State Emotion. Then I will explain how the
implementation of IIT on the state level would influence future methodology, suggesting that
Tononi’s notions of integration and differentiation, resulting in a quantity of “Φ” that could
be re-purposed to determine the grade of experience an actor may have. This mathematical
approach offers potential solvency for quantifying factors of State Feeling transference to
State Emotion in decision-making.
Finally, I will offer additional opportunities for future research, associating the ontology
of State Emotion with other areas of IR that have been otherwise difficult to
comprehensively theorize; concluding with an examination of challenges and limitations of
implementing this approach in IR theory.
8BACKGROUND
The prevalent perception of emotions in the IR community is that they play an
influential, yet merely tangential, role in politics. Many scholars believe that either policy
makers are entirely in control of the public’s emotional image, consciously deliberating on
the role of emotions in their decisions, or that the elusive nature of emotions impedes any
serious theoretical inquiries into their influence on state leaders. The rapidly growing field of
State Emotion challenges this perception, asserting that emotion plays a direct role in
decision-making, and further, that emotions can be theorized under the appropriate
methodologies. However, in their meta-analysis of State Emotion research, Bleiker &
Hutchison determined that there is one central challenge before State Emotions can be
ontologically salient in mainstream IR theorizing: “to theorize the processes that render
individual emotions collective and thus political.”11 There remains substantial debate over
this challenge, and even State Emotion scholars argue among themselves on how exactly
State Emotion can apply to International Relations theory (as would be expected of a field
still in its infancy). Many State Emotion scholars have combined neuroscientific studies with
IR theories as a way to add rigor to their investigations. To aide in these debates, I introduce
a new neuroscientific theory, the Integrated Information Theory of consciousness, to State
Emotion discourse.
11 Hutchison, Emma, and Roland Bleiker. "Theorizing emotions in world politics." International Theory 6, no. 03 (2014):
491-514.
9Present State Emotion Discourse
To understand the current state of research, we must first look to the initial inquiries that
developed into the origin of this young field of research. State Emotion research is an
extension of an insight originally developed in political psychology and foreign policy: that
state leaders sometimes involve “the emotional rather than the calculating part of the brain”
in making decisions.12 Per contra, these initial insights left intact the dichotomy between
cognition and emotion, dismissing the implementation of emotions within rational actor
paradigms. Most of these theories only allowed for emotion to have a supplementary role,
subscribing to the belief that emotion played an unnecessary yet occasionally influential role
in decision-making.
Jonathan Mercer and Neta Crawford, considered to be the original scholars of State
Emotion, were the first to address this dichotomy by asserting that emotions are equally
influential, if not more so, than cognition in state-level decision-making. This changed the
landscape of emotional analysis in IR theory, as this new perspective suggested that
rationality and emotion are not mutually exclusive processes, and that both processes are
analytically necessary to understand fundamental state behaviors. As Mercer put it,
“understanding how rational actors think requires turning to emotions.”13 These two
theorists were also among the first to challenge the strictly reductionist viewpoint that
state-level emotion is entirely attributable to each of the individuals that contribute to it. The
two assumptions that emotion is fundamental, yet indirectly associated with, the analysis of
state behavior have provided the foundation for most of the existing literature on State
Emotion.
12 Hutchison, Emma, and Roland Bleiker. "Theorizing emotions in world politics." International Theory 6, no. 03 (2014):
491-514.
13 Mercer, Jonathan. “Emotion and Strategy in the Korean War.” International Organization. 67, no. 2 (2013): 221–252.
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Bleiker and Hutchinson identified that State Emotion inquiries each fall under one of
two different approaches, defined as the macro and micro distinction. The main distinction is
that “macro approaches devise general theories of how emotions matter in world politics
while micro studies focus on how specific emotions gain resonance in particular political
circumstances.”14 In other words, macro approaches attempt to explain the processes of how
individual emotions become salient at the group level and analyze the fundamental nature of
such emotions. This is where theorists argue the existence, reducibility, and constitutional
bindings of State Emotion. Micro approaches focus on circumstantial analyses to gain
perspectives on how emotions may have influenced past decisions to provide insight onto
how they may influence future decisions. This is where theorists argue State Emotion’s
manifestation, function, and variance in decision-making. Three areas of common
disagreement within State Emotion research initially emerged from the nature of these
classifications and remain as obstacles that prevent the ontology of State Emotion in IR: the
primacy of the body, the reducibility to the individual level, and the role of interpretation in
its manifestation.
Obstacles Preventing an Ontology
The primacy of the body debate is centered around the physicalist notion that emotions
are held to internal mechanisms within a body, and therefore cannot exist outside of a
biological organism. This has led political scientists such as Janice Stein to critique the
attribution of emotion to groups: “How emotions move from the individual to the collective
is still inadequately articulated… Groups, after all, do not feel or think; individuals do.”15
14 Hutchison, Emma, and Roland Bleiker. "Theorizing emotions in world politics." International Theory 6, no. 03 (2014):
491-514.
15 Stein, Janice G. “Threat Perception in International Relations.” The Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology, edited by
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Rose McDermott, in accordance with the notion of physicalism, asserts that physicality is
absolutely necessary in considering the existence of emotion in any form, and thus emotions
have no place in collective entities.16 This is where many scholars against the notion of
State Emotion have concluded that states are “ontologically incapable of having feelings”17
due to the observation that a state does not have a spatially contiguous body. This hotly
disputed nexus is captured well within the ‘no body, no emotion’ problem, in that “Emotion
happens in biological bodies, not in the space between them.”18 On the other extreme of the
debate, some theorists such as LHM Ling suggest that emotions exist at a level that is
independent from embodiment, following a dualist perspective on emotions.19 However,
almost all proponents of State Emotion, such as Mercer and Crawford, place their analyses
within the scope of component emergence, subscribing to the notion that emotions require a
body and that emotion is capable of exerting influence beyond the individual; yet, each
disagree over whether or not the same emotions can be isolated within an individual apart
from the group.
The individual reducibility of emotion is adamantly contended from within this middle
ground, especially among the strongest proponents of State Emotion. Most scholars are
divided between two camps; on one end, that State Emotion averages from a collective of
individual emotions, or alternatively, that State Emotion merely mimics the majority’s
emotions. This contention has created a fundamental fissure in State Emotion analysis,
despite the reasoning behind each of these perceptions being very similar and often linked
Leonie Huddy, David O. Sears, and Jack S. Levy, 364–94. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.
16 McDermott, Rose. “The Feeling of Rationality: The Meaning of Neuroscientific Advances for Political Science.”
Perspectives on Politics 2, no. 104 (2004): 691–706.
17 Digeser, Paul. “Friendship Between States.” British Journal of Political Science 39, no. 2 (2008): 323–44.
18 Mercer, Jonathan. "Feeling like a state: social emotion and identity." International Theory. 6, no. 03 (2014): 515-535.
19 Ling, L.H.M. “Decolonizing the International: Towards Multiple Emotional Worlds.” International Theory. 6, no. 3
(2014): 579–83.
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by similar approaches. Both perspectives rely on individuals to produce the emotion,
proposing that State Emotion is based on component emergence with the aggregation of
individual emotions; howbeit, Mercer fundamentally argues that “group level emotion is
powerful, pervasive and irreducible to individuals”20 while Crawford emphasizes that
categorizing groups as minimally-reducible entities for feelings “would be both imprecise
and perhaps even dangerous.”21 While Mercer’s compromise of extending physicalism with
component emergence is perhaps the most popular conclusion for State Emotion, the results
of many sociological experiments have made both perspectives inconclusive; consequently,
many scholars question whether State Emotion can exist at all if it cannot be reduced to
observable entities.
The role of interpretation has been used as a double-edged sword for both reductionist
and non-reductionist perspectives. Both extremes commonly agree that there is at least some
degree of representation and interpretation in communication; the conclusion of which
asserts that no two humans can truly know the nuances of each other’s emotions.22
Reductionists in IR argue that this is the reason why collective emotion appears to differ
from the sum of its parts, as there is an inauthentic representational difference rather than an
existential difference.23 Non-reductionists argue that representation is the key link to the
existence of State Emotion, as they assert State Emotion cannot exist without a culture or
shared interpretations.24 The nuances of this role are further debated between
non-reductionists; while these scholars agree that there is always a level of interpretation in
20 Mercer, Jonathan. "Feeling like a state: social emotion and identity." International Theory. 6, no. 03 (2014): 515-535.
21 Crawford, Neta C. "The passion of world politics: Propositions on emotion and emotional relationships." International
Security 24, no. 4 (2000): 116-156.
22 Gallagher, Shaun, and Somogy Varga. “Social Constraints on the Direct Perception of Emotion and Intentions.” Topoi:
An International Review of Philosophy 33 (2014): 185–99.
23 Bleiker, Roland. Aesthetics and World Politics. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012.
24 Parkinson, Brian, Agneta H. Fischer, and Antony SR “Manstead. Emotion in social relations: Cultural, group, and
interpersonal processes.” Psychology Press, 2005.
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represented emotions, there is disagreement on the extent to which culture and intention
affect what individuals convey to one another as well as the overall influence such
interpretations play at the state level of decision-making.25
These disputes characterize the obstacles that challenge the solvency of State Emotion.
To overcome these obstacles, Bleiker and Hutchison point out the necessity “to theorize the
processes that turn individual emotions collective, social, public, and , thus, political.” I
theorize that this can be done by implementing the Integrated Information Theory of
consciousness to institutionalized states, if we define a state as a distributed network and
emotion as a characteristic of intrinsic experience.
The Integrated Information Theory of Consciousness (IIT)
Scholars of State Emotion have frequently turned to neuroscientific studies to provide a
basis for their arguments. Many of these scholars heavily depend on neuroscience to make
sense of their assertions, while others are wary of implementing these studies fully into the
realm of political science. The Integrated Information Theory of consciousness is a
neuroscience theory that, I argue, has direct relevancy to the study of International Relations
theory, specifically to State Emotion, in a way that offers unique solvency from other
neuroscientific inquiries. First, I will reflect on the development of IIT, examining the
insights it has brought to the scientific understanding of consciousness. Then I will explain
the advantages of using neuroscience in IR to explain the general direction of this particular
analysis throughout the broader discourse. I will reflect on the common critiques and
limitations of using neuroscience to frame the advantages of using IIT over other
neuroscientific theories, looking at the adaptive nuances of this perspective. Finally, I’ll
25 Ross, AndrewA.G. “Coming in from the Cold: Emotions and Constructivism.” European Journal of International
Relations. 12, no. 2 (2006): 197–222.
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demonstrate the relevancy of these insights directly to the nature of emotion and how they
serve to overcome the obstacles to ontology in State Emotion research.
IIT was developed by Giulio Tononi in 2004 to provide a possible account for the
mind-body problem which has plagued the field of philosophical phenomenology for
centuries. Rather than theorizing the ethereal properties of consciousness, Tononi focuses on
defining it in objective terms and determining how it can be generated. This is a much more
scientific approach, as comparing the neural correlates behind consciousness against the
predictions of his theory has been made increasingly apparent through advances in
neuroscience, validating much of his work. He updated his theory and model in 2008, 2012,
and 2014 to establish more explicit calculations of intrinsic experience as a contextually
emergent property of sufficiently complex and distributed networks.
The core motivation of IIT is to provide the means to “analyze systems of mechanisms
to determine if they are properly structured to give rise to consciousness, how much of it,
and of which kind.”26 There are many key understandings that are supported throughout the
axioms and postulates of the theory and will be relied upon for the application of IIT to
collectives. First, Tononi asserts that consciousness is synonymous with experience.27 This
is also in line with social theories on state personhood, which look at experience as a
necessary prerequisite for consciousness.28 Second, Tononi asserts that experience is “an
intrinsic property of a complex of mechanisms” rather than solely dependent on a certain
biological composition, subsequently removing the limitations for animals or “manufactured
26 Oizumi, Masafumi, Larissa Albantakis, and Giulio Tononi. "From the Phenomenology to the Mechanisms of
Consciousness: Integrated Information Theory 3.0." PLOS Computational Biology, 2014.
27 Tononi, Giulio. “Integrated information theory of consciousness: an updated account.” Archives italiennes de biologie,
150, no. 4 (2012): 56-90.
28 Wendt, Alexander. “The state as person in international theory.” Review of International Studies, 30 (2004): 289-316.
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entities” to possess some level or form of intrinsic experience.29 Third, he suggests that the
causal emergence of experience originates from the manifestation of a non-zero quantity of
integrated information within a network.30 Namely, he implies that the fundamental
substrate of experience is the integrated information that is sufficiently organized in certain
systems; one cannot exist without anticipating a minimal presence of the other. Fourth, he
asserts that experience can be mathematically calculated on a spectrum, proposing that there
are different grades of consciousness that vary between systems rather than regarding the
possession of experience as an absolute trait.31
By analyzing consciousness through these understandings, IIT has offered ontological
support for many of the observations in neuroscientific inquires, particularly the loss and
recovery of consciousness associated with experimental manipulation of information
integration within the human brain.32 This approach has garnered major support among
scientists, inspiring the application of the IIT tenets to data on neural and computational
networks, creating new traditions of theoretical neuroscience. Tononi has developed a
mathematical framework for neuroscientists to infer which causal structures could feasibly
possess consciousness, based both on principle and to guide research, which will hopefully
allow for comparative calculations of consciousness between different biological organisms
once future advances in neuroscience provide clearer maps of more complex neural
structures.
29 Tononi, Giulio. “Consciousness as integrated information: a provisional manifesto.” The Biological Bulletin, 215, no. 3
(2008): 216-242.
30 Tononi, Giulio. "An information integration theory of consciousness." BMC Neuroscience 5, no. 1 (2004): 1-22.
31 Tononi, Giulio. “Consciousness as integrated information: a provisional manifesto.” The Biological Bulletin, 215, no. 3
(2008): 216-242.
32 Ibid.
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CONSIDERATIONS
To frame the role of my hypothesis in the context of State Emotion research and to
demonstrate the unique solvency of the Integrated Information Theory, several logical
considerations of its merit must be explored. First, I will look at the strengths of using a
neuroscientific approach for State Emotion by examining its current prevalence in
international relations theorizing, reflecting on both the positive and negative attributes of
utilizing neuroscientific insights within the discipline. Then I will focus on the applicability
of IIT specifically, pointing to the ways that it overcomes the common disadvantages of
mainstream neuroscience. Determining the relevance of experience, and therefore IIT, in the
formation of emotions will lead to a few observations that justify a theory of State Feeling.
Finally, I will reflect on IIT’s ability to overcome the previously examined obstacles to
developing an ontology of State Emotion, solidifying the reasoning for why the logic of IIT
should take precedence over other theories to support the formation of State Emotion.
Insights of Neuroscience in IR
There are many advantages to applying neuroscience, particularly IIT, to International
Relations theory, as evidenced by the prominent use of neuroscience in previous
publications on State Emotion. In her own observations on this trend, Rose McDermott
pointed to the most attractive reason as to why neuroscience has been used time and time
again in this new field: the ability to provide quantifiable, “hard scientific” answers to the
17
most elusive questions.33 While it is not necessary for theorists to be empirically-minded,
offering empirical support for new theories, especially those that are not widely accepted as
fundamental truths in international relations, offer credibility in a way that case studies and
historical examples simply cannot rival.
The empirically-focused field of neuroscience fits within State Emotion research in a
way that is not often found in other areas of IR, and scholars have been quick to take
advantage of this link to develop more sound theories. As McDermott puts it, “The
inherently physical system on which emotion appears to rely, at least in part, provides a
window into an interesting and more empirically supported theoretical structure for
developing models that inform our understanding of the role of emotion in the political
world.”34 Even Renée Jefferey, a strong critic of using neuroscience in IR theory, has
admitted that these studies have “revealed key facts about how the emotions function within
the human brain that are of direct relevance to the study of international politics.”35 In
addition, the influx of new discoveries in neuroscience offer direction for IR theorists. The
results of experiments and studies make causal inferences that aren’t always intuitive,
connecting factors that would otherwise be elusive. Thus, neuroscience provides the IR
community with “stubborn facts... reliable information about cause and effect that inspires
and constrains theory.”36
In fact, the field of State Emotion owes its most fundamental idea to neuroscience - that
emotion is a part of rational decision-making. Damasio’s assertion that emotions “assist the
33 McDermott, Rose. “The Body Doesn’t Lie: A Somatic Approach to the Study of Emotions in World Politics.”
International Theory. 6, no. 3 (2014): 557–62.
34 Ibid.
35 Jeffery, Renee. "The promise and problems of the neuroscientific approach to emotions." International Theory 6, no. 03
(2014): 584-589
36 Druckman, James N., Donald P. Green, James H. Kuklinski, and Arthur Lupia. “Experiments: An Introduction to Core
Concepts.” Cambridge Handbook of Experimental Political Science, 2011.
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reasoning process,”37 as well as his 1994 Somatic Marker Hypothesis, offer a foundation for
the importance of State Emotion in decision-making, which has encouraged further research
in this field. The discovery that reasoning and emotion are identical at a neurological level38
has further solidified State Emotion as a considerable influence in state-level
decision-making, irrefutably stirring the ‘emotional turn’ in IR theory.
Howbeit, while neuroscience is in many ways fundamental to State Emotion, critics
have warned about the overuse of such studies in international relations, often citing the
conceptual differences in mindset and methodology that each field embraces. The two most
divergent areas of perspective lie within materialism and emergence. As Neta Crawford
points out, the antimaterialist mindset of the humanities conflicts with essence materials in
neuroscience. Fields of social science have often relied on antimaterial theories, hence the
alternative rankings between the ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ sciences.39 Individual and social human
behavior is often theorized through case studies and observational surveys, as the
inconsistency in its nature and ethical implications limit the methodology of social
experimentation. Neuroscience, on the other hand, is almost entirely a hard science;
experiments often yield nearly identical, repeatable results with low margins of error. Indeed,
it would appear that this dichotomy between the soft and hard science has already
predictably created barriers in State Emotion inquiries that rely on neuroscience, as Jefferey
explains; “a straightforwardly materialist understanding of the emotions, with its emphasis
on the neural processes of the individual brain, appears unable to account for collective
emotions insofar as they are more than the sum of individual members’ experiences” and
37 Damasio, Antonio R. The Feeling of What Happens: Body, Emotion and the Making of Consciousness. San Diego:
Harvest, 2000.
38 Phelps, Elizabeth A. "Emotion and cognition: insights from studies of the human amygdala." Annual Review of
Psychology. 57 (2006): 27-53.
39 Crawford, Neta C. “Institutionalizing Passion in World Politics: Fear and Empathy.” International Theory 6, no. 3
(2014): 535–57.
19
that “within an anti-materialist, social account of the emotions in international relations, the
contribution of neuroscientific methods will always be limited.”40
McDermott adds to these critiques by pointing out how the somatic nature of
neuroscience fundamentally contrasts to the seemingly emergent nature of State Emotion,
and consequently suggests that State Emotion must be conceptually reevaluated as a result.
She argues that, within a neuroscientific frame of thought, emotion is typically regarded to
be, in some way, reducible to neurological inputs and outputs that can be physically
observed.41 However, scholars who agree with Mercer that State Emotion is irreducible to
the individual level must subscribe to a perspective that emotion has components that are
more than the simplicity of individual neurons. This poses a conceptual problem: “If we take
the neuroscience arguments seriously, emotion must necessarily be grounded in somatic
experience in the physical body or it would not exist at all, therefore making subsequent
social experience and transformation of such emotional experience impossible.”42
While these differences have provided legitimate limitations on the field of State
Emotion, there are a few considerations that theoretically allow for a stronger connection
between neuroscience and international relations. McDermott has provided an ultimatum of
necessity for future State Emotion researchers to retain a notion of irreducible aspects in
their theories: “Any alternative model must either present support for the foundation of
emotional experience in another material form, which would be hard to imagine, or posit an
ethereal existence, which enters the realm of the spiritual.”43 Although this was originally
part of her argument for why State Emotion must be redefined as reducible to the individual
40 Jeffery, Renee. "The promise and problems of the neuroscientific approach to emotions." International Theory 6, no. 03
(2014): 584-589
41 McDermott, Rose. “The Body Doesn’t Lie: A Somatic Approach to the Study of Emotions in World Politics.”
International Theory. 6, no. 3 (2014): 557–62.
42 Ibid.
43 Ibid.
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level, the possibility of finding another material form is not as unlikely as McDermott
believes. The IIT model rests on providing another material form for emotional experience,
thus making it a likely candidate to overcome these limitations and maintain that State
Emotion is irreducible.
TheApplicability of IIT
IIT is strongly applicable to State Emotion theorizing while still retaining the strengths
inherent to the empirical nature of mainstream neuroscientic studies. To best understand the
advantages of IIT over more mainstream neuroscience, we can reevaluate the two prominent
dichotomies between the soft and hard sciences, this time looking at the unique nature of the
conclusions derived from IIT.
The underlying logic used in the understandings of IIT focuses on the structural
similarities between brain networks that enable discussions on the implications of those
similarities. In other words, if two neural networks respond to inputs in similar ways and
share a functionally similar structure, then their byproducts, and perhaps even the intended
outputs themselves, will also be similar. This is known as causal emergence44, and allows
Tononi to assert that any causal distributed network that generates integrated information
can fall under the scope of IIT. For example, the common application of the IIT model
between organisms ignores the differences in genetic components and focuses entirely on
the structure of the brain. Although the genetic makeup of neurons, and sometimes even the
physical properties of neurons, differ from one organism to the next, IIT still applies so long
as the structure between the neurons is functionally similar.45 Thus, the mechanisms only
44 Beckermann, Ansgar. "Supervenience, Emergence, and Reduction." Emergence or Reduction? Essays on the Prospects
of Nonreductive Physicalism, 1992.
45 Tononi, Giulio. “Consciousness as integrated information: a provisional manifesto.” The Biological Bulletin, 215, no. 3
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need to be functionally similar, not physically identical, when it comes to the traits of a
network giving rise to similar byproducts, such as consciousness.
IIT provides another material form for the analysis of State Emotion by asserting that
experience - including the emotional - is a causally emergent property of a network rather
than based in biological composition.46 Conveniently, this requires that a physical substrate
in the body is still a necessary component, remaining in compliance with the implications of
materialism in both neuroscience and State Emotion; McDermott acknowledged that the
‘body’ could be defined “at least within the architecture of the human brain,”47 which is
precisely the material form that IIT uses. Therefore, IIT still abides by the common mindset
in neuroscience while simultaneously serving to explain emergent processes in State
Emotion. By implementing this ‘architecture’ on a larger scale, IR theories stand to gain
insight rather than becoming limited.
As an inherently causal emergence theory, unique from the mechanical emergence (tied
purely to Newtonian physics) and component emergence (tied to the properties of the
substrate for its collective properties) that are fundamental to most neuroscientific studies
used in State Emotion research, IIT relies on somatic reasoning in a way that enables a
scientific discussion between the functions of neurons and humans. While physiologically
each neuron is much simpler than an entire human, their functional expressions in networks
are very similar to our own at the collective level, especially as it pertains to the integration
of information. It is often a prominent misconception that neurons are simple biological
feed-forward systems; namely, that they are binary systems with only “on” and “off”. In fact,
(2008): 216-242.
46 Tononi, Giulio. "An information integration theory of consciousness." BMC Neuroscience 5, no. 1 (2004): 1-22.
47 McDermott, Rose. “The Body Doesn’t Lie: A Somatic Approach to the Study of Emotions in World Politics.”
International Theory. 6, no. 3 (2014): 557–62.
22
they are incredibly complex biological organisms, working interdependently to construct
what we define as the brain.48 Thus, component emergent theories that restrict
neuroscientific applications due to our own individual complexity become irrelevant in this
context.
Therefore, the limitations of somatic perspectives in neuroscience are not as prohibitive
as McDermott and other IR theorists have asserted. IIT argues for a form of emergence that
relates directly to the nature of State Emotion, as the existence of a state relies on the
external functions of individuals just as our own consciousness relies on the functional
expressions between neurons. Without the ability for humans to communicate, a state cannot
exist, just as a clump of unconnected neurons does not consist of a mind. This gives IIT a
unique level of solvency that other neuroscientic theories have failed to account for.
The Relevance of Experience in Theorizing State Emotion
It is not simply enough to explain how IIT is applicable in IR, as there can be logically
applicable theories that are ultimately unfruitful in analysis. The utility of the IIT model lies
in the necessity of some level of experience, defined within IIT as consciousness, for
feelings to become emotions. Crawford asserted that “emotions can become part of a
feedback loop of behavior and feelings.”49 Additionally models of emotion formation are
necessarily predicated on intrinsic experience and somatic feelings, as emotions are the
contextualization of experiencing those feelings under specific circumstances.50 Yet, there is
currently no notion of “State Feeling” recognized in State Emotion discourse. The
48 Bullock, Theodore Holmes. "Signals and signs in the nervous system: the dynamic anatomy of electrical activity is
probably information-rich." Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 94, no. 1 (1997): 1-6.
49 Crawford, Neta C. “Institutionalizing Passion in World Politics: Fear and Empathy.” International Theory 6, no. 3 (2014):
535–57.
50 Barlassina, Luca, and Albert Newen. "The Role of Bodily Perception in Emotion: In Defense of an Impure Somatic
Theory." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2013, 637-78.
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recognition of State Feeling’s importance is essential for emotional experience to play a key
role in future IR research.
State Emotion scholars often conflate emotion and feeling together, sometimes
acknowledging doing so and dismissing the association as inconsequential to their
analyses.51 This is often because of the psychological dichotomies that could potentially
complicate the analogies that they use in analyzing the effects of collective emotions. I argue
that this is a mistake that has clouded rather than simplified the arguments behind State
Emotion; the conflation of these definitions has often necessitated additional reasoning to
cover analogous gaps between collective emotion to individual emotion, which has drawn
skepticism to the entire notion itself. Without a theoretical avenue for feelings to become
emotions, the implications of State Emotion cannot be conceptually analogous to the similar
psychological processes that rely heavily upon that avenue. By examining the necessity of
this defined difference in psychology, it will become apparent that a theory of State Feeling
and the experience of those feelings are necessary components for current theories of State
Emotion.
Until recently, there has been a prominent dichotomy in emotion theorizing between
affect oriented theories and cognitive oriented theories. These two classifications have
argued over the phenomenological existence of emotion as well as the process of emotion
formation. The defined separation of feeling from emotion has been critical in the
consolidation and resolution of this dichotomy in many psychological theories, which is why
it should serve as an insightful practice in State Emotion theorizing.
The first advancement in emotion theorizing was led by psychologists William James
51 Mercer, Jonathan. "Feeling like a state: social emotion and identity." International Theory. 6, no. 03 (2014): 515-535.
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and Karl Lange, who proposed that emotions are entirely perceptions of bodily states, thus
characterizing the affect oriented approach.52 The implications of this theory changed the
prominent perspectives at the time; rather than a physical response being a result of an
emotion, James and Karl were suggesting that the emotions were the result of
acknowledging our physical response. For example, an upset stomach would give way to the
understanding that one is experiencing fear.53 However, the James-Lange theory fails to
account for the ability to overcome feelings, conflicts between feelings and emotions, and
the existence of emotions in anticipation of something that is not present or does not
physically exist.
Keith Oatley developed the cognitive theory of emotions to resolve these discrepancies;
he asserted that emotions were the result of an assessment of a particular situation based on
reason. Namely, if it is logical to anticipate being unprepared for a pop quiz, then one will
feel fear even before it is present.54 Under this assertion, happiness is a way of telling the
mind that the environment is safe and fear is a way of telling the mind that there is a threat in
the environment. Despite the lasting popularity of this theory, psychologist Albert Newen
has recently pointed out that this theory falls short as it avoids an explanation for the role of
somatic feelings, under the context of an evolutionary advantage or otherwise.55
In response to this dichotomy, Luca Barlassina and Albert Newen developed the
“integrative embodiment theory of emotions” that combines these two camps. This theory
asserts that an emotion only exists when the experience of a somatic feeling is integrated
52 James, William. “What is an emotion?” Mind, 9 (1884): 188-205.
53 Ibid.
54 Oatley, Keith, and Philip N. Johnson-Laird. "Towards a cognitive theory of emotions." Cognition and emotion 1, no. 1
(1987): 29-50.
55 Barlassina, Luca, and Albert Newen. "The Role of Bodily Perception in Emotion: In Defense of an Impure Somatic
Theory." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2013, 637-78.
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with a cognitive assessment of an intentional object.56 For example, encountering a snake
could initially invoke a fearful feeling; howbeit, if the individual believes they are safe from
the snake, the individual would not have the emotion of fear despite the continued presence
of the somatic reaction. Due to the feedback provided by integrating the information,
cognitive assessments could then change the feeling or increasing the strength of the feeling
could encourage a cognitive re-evaluation of the situation. This circular nature allows for
feelings to result from a cognitive assessment as well, allowing somatic responses to
imagined scenarios. Additionally, the model provided by this theory is not only congruent
with IIT; it complements IIT since both rely on information integration to satisfy their
conclusions. Therefore, I will use Barlassina and Newen’s integrative embodiment theory of
emotions as the central logic to provide examples of the manifestation of State Feeling in
institutionalized states, further demonstrating why the separation of feeling from emotion
should be a common practice for State Emotion theorizing.
Contexts of State Feeling
Since many State Emotion theorists have operated on a conflated definition of feelings
and emotions, there are many previously established examples of collective emotion that,
by creating a defined separation of these processes, would actually fall under the scope of
State Feeling. For the purposes of this analysis, State Feeling will be defined as a collective
domestic reaction to an international situation, just as a somatic feeling is an internal
reaction to an environmental situation. My definition of State Emotion will extend
Barlassina and Newen’s integrative embodiment theory of emotions to the state level: the
combination of the state’s experience of State Feeling with the cognitive assessment of an
56 Ibid.
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international context. To provide clarity to this distinction, I will implement analogies
between humans and states as well as components of existing social theories relating to
collective intentions.
The contextualization of a somatic feeling to create an emotion is a similar process in
both humans and states. If an individual has a stomach ache, then that is a somatic feeling in
response to a situation (the situation could either be present or imagined, but it has
provoked a physical response nonetheless). A stomach ache out of context does not provide
an understanding of the individual’s emotion; the individual may be nervous, but they are
equally likely to simply be hungry. By cognitively assessing the situation, which can be
done unconsciously in response to a familiar environment or context, the emotion becomes
apparent. Knowing that one will be taking a test in the near future forms the emotion of
anxiety, thus motivating the individual to study rather than eat. Integrating the information
of a somatic feeling with contextual information gives the individual an emotional
experience that can be used to act towards an intentional object.57
In the case of a state, a riot affecting the federal government would qualify as a State
Feeling; riots, panics, and similar collective reactions often represent a feed-forward
aggregation of the fight-or-flight response rather than an organized decision-making entity.
Instead, the governing leaders that are embedded in the institution serve as the mechanisms
of the state that turn State Feelings into State Emotions; they can establish a cognitive
assessment of the situation by having the contextual knowledge that the riots must be a
negative reaction to recent sanctions enacted against the state, and proceed to stir the State
Emotion of anger or resentment toward the states that enacted the sanctions. This process is
57 Barlassina, Luca, and Albert Newen. "The Role of Bodily Perception in Emotion: In Defense of an Impure Somatic
Theory." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2013, 637-78.
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embodied by Crawford’s interpretation of how State Emotion becomes “institutionalized.”
She provides a convenient model that portrays the interactions of these elements at the
individual level, although feelings and emotions are used interchangeability, shown in
Figure 1 (from Crawford 2014).
Figure 1. Crawford’s “Institutionalization” of Emotion
To support the qualification of a riot as a State Feeling rather than a State Emotion, List
and Pettit’s Group Agency theory is particularly useful. The dichotomy of
“proposition-wise supervenience” versus “set-wise supervenience” can explain why such
collective emotions cannot be defined as a State Emotion; although the riot was formed
from the aggregation of individual emotions, the riot as a group does not have a
“Constitution,” that is, there lacks an organizational structure within the group that allows
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for the processing of individual emotions into a collective output.58 Subsequently, a riot
would be an example of proposition-wise supervenience, the existence of which requires
that the set of individuals must all share the same intention in order for that intention to be
translated to the group level.59 List and Pettit argue that, due to the lack of constitution,
such entities cannot possess intention or decision-making capabilities.60 Without any form
of intention, particularly at the level of international decision-making, a collective can only
serve as a sub-mechanism of the state, not as a direct representative for State Emotion.
On the other hand, the institutionalized state as a whole would have set-wise
supervenience, which indicates that a group intention is formed from a range of intentions
over a range of issues that particular individuals do not need to precisely share;
subsequently, group intentions could differ significantly from what any one individual had
in mind.61 In this case, the leaders would not necessarily experience anger as individuals,
nor as members of the state; for this to be true, the leaders must experience the same
emotion first-hand, which is not a reliably consistent measure outside of authoritarian
regimes.62 Instead, they would be experiencing anger as the state, politically motivated by
it but not necessarily personally-motivated, which plays an important part in theorizing state
behavior.
Additionally, the associated survival purposes of the feeling-emotion balance for
individuals can apply equally to states, encouraging its development in both entities. To
stop a feeling requires resolving the stimulating issue, and as such, uncomfortable or
negative feelings serve as a strong motivational force. Each actor will continue to make
58 List and Pettit. “GroupAgency and Supervenience.” Southern Journal of Philosophy, XLIV (2006): 85-105.
59 Ibid.
60 Ibid.
61 Ibid.
62 Ibid.
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emotionally-motivated decisions until the feeling and subsequent emotion has dissipated.63
This psychological argument for individuals is consistent with Smith and Mackie’s
Intergroup Emotions Theory that analyzes collective emotions. They argue that group
behaviors are emotionally motivated; after generating a behavior, the behavior can, in turn,
change the circumstances that stimulated the collective emotion. Since the collective
emotion dissipates in those scenarios, it can be deduced that the behavior was
emotionally-motivated and that the collective emotion only exists when necessary to drive
the behavior.64
Such motivations are essential for survival; for example, experiencing fear can lead to
behaviors that reduce that fear, such as avoiding a predator (or a war); this in turn makes the
individual - or the state - more likely to live longer.65 Furthermore, knowing that one is safe
from the threat, despite the presence of fearful somatic feelings, would not instill fear,
which is advantageous as it avoids unnecessary behavior that may otherwise bring attention
from a real threat. Referring back to List and Pettit’s Group Agency theory, the association
of intention with set-wise supervenience over proposition-wise supervenience could be
sufficiently explained through the attribution of State Emotion and State Feeling to each
type of group under a survival context; states are capable of intention and behavior66
because they have access to emotions, which are key to regulating survival responses,
whereas collectives such as riots cannot have agency predicated solely on feelings67 due to
the potential dangers that reacting solely on feelings would entail.
63 Darwin, Charles. The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965.
64 Smith, Eliot R., and Diane M. Mackie. “Intergroup Emotions.” Handbook of Emotions, 3rd edition, edited by Michael
Lewis, Jeannette M. Haviland-Jones, and Lisa Feldman Barrett. New York: The Guilford Press, 2008.
65 Izard, Carroll E. "Emotion theory and research: Highlights, unanswered questions, and emerging issues." Annual Review
of Psychology 60 (2009): 1.
66 List and Pettit. “GroupAgency and Supervenience.” Southern Journal of Philosophy, XLIV (2006): 85-105.
67 Ibid.
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These observations allow us to understand emotion as a culmination of feelings,
experience, and cognition, the purpose of which is specifically to motivate behavior. Since
this model provides a methodology for determining the influence of popular opinion over
the opinion of a leader in determining state behavior, even in irrational circumstances, there
is strong support for using a separate distinction of State Feeling in the future analysis of
State Emotion. Howbeit, the transference of State Feeling to State Emotion still necessitates
a theory of experience. IIT can establish this theoretical avenue for State Feelings to
become State Emotions.
TheAdvantages of IIT to Address Obstacles to Ontology
The obstacles to ontology that have yet to be matched by other neuroscientific theories
should be addressed before we apply IIT; the primacy of the body, reducibility, and the role
of interpretation. The logic of IIT allows for scientifically acceptable resolutions to the
ambiguous nature of State Emotion, using emergence to explain much of the
non-observable phenomena within a state. It is for this reason that the acceptance of IIT
should take precedence over other neuroscientific theories if it suitably accounts for the
obstacles to an ontology of State Emotion that cannot otherwise be determined through
reason alone.
The ‘no body, no emotion’ problem is often framed in regards to spatial contiguity; a
body (i.e. brain) often defined as an indivisible mass of smaller codependent organisms
with close and consistent proximity.68 However, this assumption is based on a correlation
rather than causation; while spatial contiguity makes the interactions between neurons
easier, it is not entirely necessary for the communication that gives rise to consciousness.
68 Wendt, Alexander. “The state as person in international theory.” Review of International Studies, 30 (2004): 289-316.
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Neurons do not rely solely on physical connections to communicate, as they can rely on the
release of chemicals in addition to electrical signals, just as we can communicate through
spoken word in addition to touch.69 Instead, Fred Dretske’s position on Informational
Philosophy relies on information and causation between the components of a whole to
create experience,70 which does not limit spatial distribution to the same degree. When
looking at the inner components of an institutionalized state, there is certainly spatial
distribution between the humans that give it function, thus a state fails the common
definition of ‘body’. Howbeit, by implementing Dretske’s approach, the observation that
there are significant levels of information and causation between humans becomes the
primary driver of a state’s ‘experience,’ allowing humans to be defined as the ‘body’ of the
state contrary to more popular definitions.
Dretske’s interpretation is further supported by split-brain studies. Many epileptic
patients undergo a procedure where the corpus collosum, the part of the brain which
connects the two hemispheres, is severed to prevent the spread of seizures from one area to
another. Despite the success of the procedure, patients have what is called “split-brain
syndrome” where he or she essentially has two separate consciousness, having two different
experiences at the same time. For example, if a picture is inaccessible to one eye, the
corresponding hemisphere is unaware of the picture’s existence, even if it is clearly in view
for the other eye. Subsequently, patients who are asked to describe what they see are unable
to do so if the picture is not seen by the same eye that corresponds with the hemisphere
responsible for speaking.71 This is evidence that spatial contiguity is irrelevant; the two
69 Bullock, Theodore Holmes. "Signals and signs in the nervous system: the dynamic anatomy of electrical activity is
probably information-rich." Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 94, no. 1 (1997): 1-6.
70 Dretske, Fred I. Naturalizing the Mind. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1997.
71 Bayne, Tim. "The Unity of Consciousness and The Split-Brain Syndrome." The Journal of Philosophy, 2008, 189-222.
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hemispheres are still in the same proximity to one another, yet there exists two
consciousnesses. Rather, the lack of information integration between the two hemispheres
adequately explains why there is disunity.72
The issue of irreducibility can be easily dismissed by accepting scientific and
philosophical approaches to consciousness. Both individual emotion and consciousness are
considered to be irreducible yet structure-dependent in various neuroscientific frameworks,
yet most scientists would fundamentally agree that its irreducibly does not make it
inconsequential.73 Consciousness still makes a difference when analyzing human
interactions with the physical world, and as such, even if it cannot be proven, consciousness
exists.74 In IR discourse, conversely, debates over the existence of State Emotion are
predicated on the ability to analytically reduce it to physical observations.75 State Emotion
qualifies as irreducible in the same way that consciousness does; consider that you cannot
capture a thought within a single neuron just as you cannot define the emotions of an
individual as a state emotion in itself. Even a leader must have the institutionalized support -
forced, paid, or voluntary - of a portion of the polity in order to turn their individual emotion
into a State Emotion.
Therefore, if the scientific ontology of consciousness - and often individual emotion -
does not exclusively adhere to reductionist frameworks, then using theories of consciousness
to support State Emotion allows for the same logical perception: that State Emotion is not
dependent on adhering to a reductionist framework for it to exist. Additionally, State
72 Tononi, Giulio. “Consciousness as integrated information: a provisional manifesto.” The Biological Bulletin, 215, no. 3
(2008): 216-242.
73 Barrett, Lisa Feldman, Batja Mesquita, Kevin N. Ochsner, and James J. Gross. "The Experience of Emotion." Annual
Review of Psychology 58 (2007): 373.
74 Tononi, Giulio. "An information integration theory of consciousness." BMC Neuroscience 5, no. 1 (2004): 1-22.
75 Hutchison, Emma, and Roland Bleiker. "Theorizing emotions in world politics." International Theory 6, no. 03 (2014):
491-514.
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Emotion has unique explanatory power over many interactions in the international world.
This is related to philosopher Dan Dennett’s conclusions, used for many arguments for
human consciousness, on the ascription of beliefs and desires to any entity: if an entity is
usefully describable as possessing beliefs and desires that embody a pattern of behaviors
otherwise difficult to explain, then that entity, for all intents and purposes has beliefs and
desires.76 Through this philosophical notion, whenever State Emotion makes a difference to
the behavior of a state, it essentially exists even if it cannot be proven to exist.
When comparing neurons and humans, it is also evident that representation and
interpretation are essential components within each network’s form of communication that
give rise to their respective irreducible properties. Many State Emotion theorists often cite
the inability for humans to represent their thoughts in a perfect manner, relying on cultural
subtexts to understand one another, as a reason for why State Emotion can only exist
through representation and not intrinsically.77 This limitation has been used by skeptics and
reductionists alike as an explanation for why State Emotion does not correlate perfectly with
the individuals it can be reduced to.
When we look to studies in neuroscience, however, we can extend the non-reductionist
argument that the role of interpretation is essential to the formation of emotion rather than an
obstacle. Neurons communicate with one another through the release of chemicals and
electrical discharges to represent information; furthermore, these chemical and electrical
signals are not universally objective. Humans cannot perfectly understand the nuances of
this information because we are not conditioned to understand the subtexts of these signals,
so neuroscientists must rely on analyzing neurological activity with the corresponding group
76 Dennett, Daniel C. "Real patterns." The Journal of Philosophy. 2008, 27-51.
77 Bleiker, Roland. Aesthetics and World Politics. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012.
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(i.e. brain) behaviors.78 These studies have found that neurons also interpret the chemical
and electrical signals, rarely 1:1, even between other neurons that were formerly thought
correlate perfectly. This interpretive barrier between neurons often causes inconsistencies in
neural activity, further complicating the role of neural correlates with behavior. Purely
objective definitions of specific signals are inaccessible, much like human communication.
For example, studies on memory recollection at the conscious level have also found that
it is an imperfect system. Every time a memory is recalled, neurons release chemicals that
are representative of certain traits of the memory, which are interpreted within the synapses
of other neurons to essentially reconstruct the memory from scratch, in turn providing
feedback to be restored within the originating neurons. The result is often a memory that
differs from the original, if only slightly at first, and continues to degrade each time it is
recalled.79 This process explains why false memories develop within the brain, closely
resembling the game of ‘telephone’ where a phrase gradually transforms into another over
the course of multiple transfers. Understanding the ways that neurons transfer information
allows for the key insight that neurons, while highly dependent on one another, are still
fundamentally individual organisms that rely on communication to form the collective entity
we define as the brain. If the brain can, indeed, give rise to consciousness despite the
prevalent roles of representation and imperfect interpretation, then it stands to reason that a
collective of humans would not be ontologically restricted by the same limitation.
78 Bullock, Theodore Holmes. "Signals and signs in the nervous system: the dynamic anatomy of electrical activity is
probably information-rich." Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 94, no. 1 (1997): 1-6.
79 Swaminathan, Nikhil. "Partial Recall: Why Memory Fades with Age." Scientific American, December, 2007. Web.
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APPLICATION
Now that the considerations for using the Integrated Information Theory of
consciousness have been thoroughly discussed, demonstrating the applicability, relevancy,
and necessity of IIT in State Emotion theorizing, as well as providing scientific solvency for
the obstacles to an ontology, the natural next step is to apply the theory to institutionalized
states. I have chosen to focus on institutionalized states rather than any other type of
international actor due to the consistency of such states having some degree of a distributed
network structure, although this does not preclude other international actors with distributed
network structures from being considered under the IIT model. My analysis is primarily
based on the model of the Integrated Information Theory “3.0” that was released by Tononi,
Oizumi, and Albantakis in 2014 although I also implement many of the arguments and
observations from Tononi’s previous works for additional clarity.
Establishing the IIT Model for IRAnalysis
The central tenets of the IIT model are categorized by axioms, postulates, and an
identity. The five axioms serve as fundamental assumptions that frame the central assertions
addressed by IIT. These assumptions reflect on the nature of consciousness as experience,
which are “to be immediately evident.”80 and “cannot be doubted and do not need proof.”81
The first axiom is existence, straightforward in that “consciousness exists” as an intrinsic
80 Tononi, Giulio. “Integrated information theory of consciousness: an updated account.” Archives italiennes de biologie,
150, no. 4 (2012): 56-90.
81 Oizumi, Masafumi, Larissa Albantakis, and Giulio Tononi. "From the Phenomenology to the Mechanisms of
Consciousness: Integrated Information Theory 3.0." PLOS Computational Biology, 2014.
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aspect of reality. This is to be evident in that our consciousness makes a difference, thus
necessitating its existence; if it didn’t make a difference to theories of the physical world,
then its existence wouldn’t matter from a scientific perspective.82
The Compositionality axiom is that “Experience is structured, consisting of multiple
aspects in various combinations,” asserting that a single experience is made up of a
multitude of senses and aspects, such as sight, sound and touch in a single moment that are
all part of a whole.83
The Information axiom is that “Experience is informative or specific - in that it differs
in its particular way from other possible experiences,” meaning that every experience
contrasts in some way from any other that has been previously experienced, will be
experienced, or experienced through an infinite number of other perspectives.84
The Integration axiom asserts that “Experience is integrated - in that it cannot be
reduced to independent components.” This asserts that the composition of an experience is
indivisible; for example, the sight of a red triangle cannot be seen as a triangle and a red
patch separately.85
Finally, the Exclusion axiom is that “Experience is exclusive - in that it has definite
borders, temporal, and spatial grain” which alludes to the fact that no two experiences can
exist fully and simultaneously, either in time or space.86 This final axiom is often used as
part of a common argument for why IIT cannot apply to a collective of humans;
subsequently, I will explain my case for its application to collectives, particularly states,
under the analysis of the Exclusion postulate.
82 Oizumi, Masafumi, Larissa Albantakis, and Giulio Tononi. "From the Phenomenology to the Mechanisms of
Consciousness: Integrated Information Theory 3.0." PLOS Computational Biology, 2014.
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Tononi provides further explanation behind why each of these axioms are self-evident
and essential in his previous frameworks, using a number of thought experiments to
demonstrate their phenomenological significance. Even so, as the scientific acceptance of
IIT within tiers of psychology, neuroscience, philosophy, and artificial intelligence theory
has formally relied upon the conclusions of this axiomatic system,87 there is a sufficiently
reasonable ground for considering IIT in selective ontological investigations of IR theory,
such as State Emotion.
The Initial Postulates of IIT
The postulates of IIT are the at the heart of analytically attributing experience to states.
The aim of this analysis is not to determine whether a state’s experience is equivalent to that
of a human, or that of any other living being; rather, it is essential for the hypothesis to prove
that a state possesses some level of experience. If there is something it is like to be a state,
then a state could have the ontological potential for emotion. In consequence, the burden of
this section is solely to provide the reasoning for non-zero quantities within an
institutionalized state for each of these postulates. Tononi’s mathematical interpretations
within each postulate provide a way to theoretically determine the specific grade of
experience within an entity; howbeit, extensive network analysis applying these formulas
should be relegated to future research since his equations will not be exhausted within this
analysis.
Tononi developed five postulates that parallel each axiom. These postulates serve as
“unproven assumption[s]... about the physical world and specifically about the physical
substrates of consciousness... which can be formalized and form the basis of the
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mathematical framework of IIT.”88 In other words, these are the key ideas that “specify
which conditions must be satisfied by physical mechanisms” to determine which distributed
networks could, in principle, have a non-zero quantity of integrated information, and thus
which entities possess a form of experience.89 The first two postulates, Existence and
Composition, question the nature of the system under analysis. The final three, Information,
Integration, and Exclusion, each apply to both the individual mechanisms within the system
as well as the system itself; consequently, each of these postulates require two different
levels of analysis before they can be satisfied.
The Existence postulate asserts that mechanisms in the entity exist and that a system is
defined as a set of mechanisms. IIT defines a mechanism as anything “having a causal role
within a system, for example, a neuron in the brain, or a logic gate in a computer.”90 In other
words, there must be cause-effect power that exists intrinsically unto itself, otherwise the
entire system is nothing more than a feed-forward system. Based on these parameters, an
institutionalized state satisfies the Existence postulate; humans have a causal role within a
state, and these humans individually change the probability of a multitude of inputs from
becoming any one output, thus qualifying as the mechanisms that must exist within the
entity.
The Composition postulate states “that elementary mechanisms can be structured,
forming higher order mechanisms in various combinations.”91 In other words, individual
elements (elementary mechanisms) can potentially work together as pairs (second-order
mechanisms) or as groups (third-order mechanisms), thus creating a “power set” of potential
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arrangement combinations, each of which must have cause-effect power to be considered a
mechanism in itself. The power set of mechanisms A, B, and C is shown in Figure 2 (from
Tononi 2014). In the case of institutionalized states, one human has the potential to
structurally pair with another (a married couple filing taxes as a single entity, for example)
or to become part of a group (on a committee, for example). Therefore, humans within an
institutionalized state can and often form a variety of power sets, each with their own
cause-effect power, that overall satisfies the Composition postulate.
.
Figure 2. A Power Set of Three Mechanisms
The Postulates Applied to Mechanisms
First I will discuss the postulates on the level of mechanisms before moving to the
postulates as they apply to the system. The Information postulate as it relates specifically to
mechanisms is analyzed through the calculation of “cause-effect information”, or cei. This
conceptualization is designed to calculate the “differences that make a difference” from the
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system’s perspective.92 Information is both causal and intrinsic, quantified “by considering
how a mechanism in its current state constrains the system’s potential past and future
[actions].”93 In other words, cei is a measure of how the presence of any particular
mechanism determines the probability that the mechanism responds to particular causes on
behalf of the system and the probability that the system will change from future effects
created by the mechanism. Only mechanisms that create information can be a part of
experience, since experience is constituted by information.94
For example, a pen used to write government documents is a causal mechanism, yet
entirely deterministic with 0 cei. It always and exclusively responds to one scenario, a push,
and always and exclusively leads to one effect, that of depositing ink in the exact spot the
pen was pushed. Therefore the pen does not create any information within the system,
despite having a causal role. On the other hand, the President of a country will have high cei,
as he has a large cause repertoire of what he could react to on behalf of the state as a whole
and he has a large effect repertoire of how he could change the behavior of the state through
his choice of actions. The President as a mechanism definitely generates information within
the state, as with other leaders, government officials, and voters. Therefore, the President can
qualify as a mechanism that contributes to the experience of the state, whereas the pen that
the President uses to sign a bill would not since it is merely feed-forwarding an output that is
entirely determined by the President’s input.
The Integration postulate examines the irreducibly of a mechanism itself or of the
system to its mechanisms. This is done by quantifying integrated information, represented as
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the Greek letters Φ or φ: “information that is generated by the whole... above and beyond the
information generated by its parts.”95 For individual mechanisms, this postulate imposes
that “mechanisms that do not generate integrated information do not exist from the intrinsic
perspective of a system.”96 This mechanical notion, represented as φ and referred to as
“small phi,” is best understood when each mechanism is partitioned to measure the changes
in the cei as illustrated by Figure 3 (from Tononi 2014). Figure 3B demonstrates how
elements A and B generate integrated information because both share at least one element
from the cause repertoire and both share at least one element from the effect repertoire;
therefore, partitioning the two would cause a loss of information. In this example,
mechanism [AB] would exist intrinsically from the perspective of the system.
Figure 3. Examples of Partitioned Mechanisms
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In the case of a state, for example, we can associate a senator and a representative from
the same local county as a second order mechanism. Many of the same voters will have the
potential to influence the response of both congressmen, and both congressmen could
respond by passing a joint government action exclusively requiring both of their
participation. Despite the fact that the two individuals may have never directly interacted
with one another, they are part of the same mechanism entirely because they generate
integrated information in their cause-effect repertoires. Like mechanism [AB], the
combination of these two congressmen are considered to be a mechanism that “exists from
the intrinsic perspective of the system, in the sense that it plays an irreducible causal role; it
picks up a difference that makes a difference to the system in such a way that cannot be
accounted for by its parts.”97
If the two congressmen did not have the option to pass a joint government action, then
the integrated information about the future generated by that possibility would be lost, as
shown by Figure 3C. The mechanism of the two congressmen would cease to exist
intrinsically since the support of the same constituency makes no difference in the future of
how the congressmen will change the system. If both were senators, consequently influenced
by entirely different voting pools, the past integrated information from the cause repertoire
would be lost, as shown by Figure 3D. In this case the mechanism would not exist
intrinsically because there is no similarity in the input, and thus the input could not influence
the current intentions of the senators in a shared way. If we were to associate a senator with a
foreign businessman, the combination would be an entirely reducible mechanism as both
would respond to entirely different elements and both would make entirely different
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decisions. Namely, as seen in Figure 3A, associating the two would not yield any
information about the past or future to determine whether there are “differences that make a
difference” between them. As partitioning them would not change their cei from the intrinsic
perspective of the system, their φ = 0, and the association as an integrated second order
mechanism would not constitute any part of the state’s experience, even if they interacted
directly with one another.
The Exclusion postulate as it relates to mechanisms asserts that “a mechanism can have
only one cause and one effect, those that are maximally irreducible.”98 In this context, the
postulate is referring to the core cause and core effect, which refer to sets of causes and
effects. In other words, a mechanism that contributes to experience cannot have an infinite
number of causes and effects, as cause and effect must be limited to the smallest set of
elements as possible. The existence of a maximally irreducible cause-effect repertoire
(“MICE”) determines which mechanisms are foundational to the state’s experience versus
the mechanisms that are merely components or collections of other mechanisms.99 These
foundational mechanisms have an additional term to signify their importance in future
analysis: “concepts.”
As a thought exercise, if the Supreme Court was to be defined as a concept, then, for an
over-simplified description, the association of the nine justices would constitute a higher
order mechanism while the maximally irreducible set of causes would include the two
persuasive arguments of each lawyer and the maximally irreducible set of effects would be
the decisions to either uphold or overturn a lower court. As it currently stands, the number of
potential lawyers who could deliver persuasive arguments to the Court is consistently
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limited to two, and as such there is one core cause since the set will always be two.
Hypothetically, if all of the members of the Supreme Court Bar Association addressed the
Court, so long as this arrangement remained consistent for every trial, that would also count
as one core cause. This breaks down when the number is inconsistent; if any number of
lawyers could address the Court over the course of any number of trials, then the set of
potential causes per trial would include {2, 3, 4, 5 ... N} where N is the maximum amount of
lawyers available. This would entail more than one core cause; subsequently, the exclusion
principle would determine that the Supreme Court is not intrinsic defined as a concept,
either consolidated into a larger concept or split into multiple concepts depending on the
strength of integration between the lower and higher order mechanisms.
The Postulates Applied to Systems
The examination of an institutionalized state clearly indicates that many of its internal
mechanisms can satisfy each postulate to at least a minimal degree; thus, the postulates must
now be applied to the state at a systemic level. Instead of looking at the mechanisms of a
state, these postulates follow the relationships between concepts. Similar existing social
theories on agency further emphasize the importance of these postulates for collective
behavior. This begins with the Information postulate; “only sets of ‘differences that make a
difference’... matter for consciousness.”100 “Conceptual Structures” are the sets referenced
by this postulate, composed of concepts that a system is divided into. The differences that
each conceptual structure makes is calculated in regards to CI, or “Conceptual Information,”
which is simply the translation of “Cause-Effect Information” to concepts. Thus the extent to
which a system can satisfy the Information postulate is determined by the interactions of
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multiple concepts in a cause-effect paradigm. In other words, if any one of multiple concepts
can influence the current order of a single concept, a change in which could subsequently
influence any one of a variety of other concepts, then there is CI within the system. In terms
of an institutionalized state, for example, any lower court decision can influence a higher
court to make a decision, and the higher court’s decision could influence the lower courts or
a higher court to make the same or alternative decisions.
This is captured well in the existing sociological theory of organic and mechanical
solidarity, proposed by Émile Durkheim. Durkheim introduced the terms "Mechanical
Solidarity" and "Organic Solidarity" to categorize the different types of societies that exhibit
what he refers to as “conscious collective”. Mechanical Solidarity represents a society which
is connected through similarities such as religion or lifestyle, and often operates in small
scale societies. Organic Solidarity, conversely, represents the interdependence of
complimentary work specializations and personalities, which operates in more advanced,
industrial societies.101
In accordance to this theory, societies with Mechanical Solidarity have low levels of
“conscious collective” while societies with Organic solidarity have high levels.102 This
assertion can be supported by analyzing each system within the context of the Information
postulate of IIT. Mechanical Solidarity, due to the uniformity between each individual with
no specialized interconnections, would have a low level of differentiation. Namely,
interactions within such systems would be limited in how much of “a difference that makes a
difference” it has on the system as a whole. Organic Solidarity, on the other hand,
emphasizes specialized connections between a wide range of individuals; subsequently, the
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interactions within these systems have much larger cause-effect repertoires and would
generate high levels of information according to IIT.
The Integration postulate asserts that “only conceptual structures that are integrated can
give rise to consciousness”103 when analyzing the system. This can be determined by
“partitioning a set of elements and measuring integrated conceptual information Φ as the
difference made by the partition”104 similar to the method of determining “small phi” at the
level of mechanisms. This time, though, there are three possibilities; in addition to either
having integration or not having any integration at all, there is the possibility of having
“weak” integration.105 This is demonstrated in Figure 4. Figure 4A shows that a partition
between the concepts makes no difference to the system, therefore that system is not
integrated. Although the system can be seen as a whole from the perspective of an observer,
Φ = 0, and the system does not exist as a whole intrinsically. Figure 4B shows a strong
integration between the concepts because they each influence one another’s cause and effect
repertoires, and thus have the highest quantity of Φ out of the four examples. Figures 4C and
4D demonstrate unidirectional connections, which qualifies as weak integration because
there is no opportunity for feedback between the two concepts, which reduces awareness.106
Feedback is necessary to become an “integral” part of the system, thus, 4C and 4D are
examples of “appendix” relationships.107
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Figure 4. Systems with Various Levels of Conceptual Information Integration
The analogy that Tononi provides in the most recent incarnation of IIT accurately
demonstrates the relationship at the human level: “As an analogy, take the executive board
of a company. An employee who transcribes the recording of a board meeting is obviously
affected by the board, but if he has no way to provide any feed-back, he should not be
considered an ‘‘integral’’ part of the board, which has no way of knowing that he exists and
what he does. The same obtains for an employee who prints the agenda for the board
meeting, if the board has no way of giving him feedback about the agenda.”108
The measure of integration is essentially equivalent to List and Pettit’s notion of
“constitution,” which is deemed to be the key difference between set-wise and
proposition-wise models. List and Pettit’s definition of constitution entails a set of rules,
implicit or explicit, which determine the order that interconnected individuals form a group
judgment from individual contributions.109 To demonstrate the need for constitution, they
use the example of a group of people at a subway stop. In theory, they are part of a group
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who are in close proximity and share a similar identity as subway users. Nonetheless, this
group does not exhibit agency in practice. List and Pettit assert this is because the group
lacks a constitution by which the information within the individuals could be collected to
create a group output.110 This interpretation of constitution is focused on the extent of
potential interactions, or the size of the cause-effect repertoire in IIT, in determining whether
or not intentions can emerge from particular groups. The Integration postulate makes nearly
an identical analysis in determining the emergence of experience by focusing on the
potential interactions of a conceptual structure.
Limitations Imposed by the Exclusion Postulate
The Exclusion postulate at the systemic level carries many implications that scholars use,
including Tononi himself,111 to dismiss the application of IIT to the collective level. I will
first present how the postulate is used in IIT before presenting my argument for why this
logic may not preempt states from qualifying as complexes with intrinsic experience. The
Exclusion postulate asserts that “only a conceptual structure that is maximally irreducible
can give rise to consciousness - other constellations generated by overlapping elements are
excluded”112
A complex, therefore, is the “set of elements within a system that generates a local
maximum of integrated conceptual information ΦMax... Only a complex exists as an entity
from the intrinsic perspective of the system.” In other words, a concept within a system can
possess consciousness if and only if it has the highest comparable amount of Φ to all other
sets that have overlapping elements; when that is the case, the concept is referred to as a
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complex. Figure 5 (from Tononi 2014) Figure 6 (from Tononi 2008) and Figure 7 (From
Tononi 2014) each demonstrate different variations of analysis for the Exclusion postulate.
In Figure 5, set [ABC] is the complex since it has ΦMax in the available system; that is, it has
the highest level of integrated information and would be the conscious entity from the power
set. Figure 6 shows a full system with overlapping sets of elements; Concept (a) creates the
consciousness for the system as it has ΦMax. Figure 7 has a variety of different types of
complexes, the phenomenon of which will be explained in later analysis.
Figure 5. Comparisons of ΦWithin Power Set ABCDEF
Figure 6. A SystemWith Overlapping Concepts
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Figure 7. A SystemWith Non-Overlapping Concepts
The Exclusion postulate is argued to be important for consciousness since an experience
needs to have definite borders, which creates an issue when the universe is both infinitely
microscopic and infinitely macroscopic. The potential of infinite scales of analysis enables
the assumption that there are an infinite number of networks that could produce a non-zero
quantity of Φ, alluding to panpyschism. In response, when a subsystem integrates its
information more than a higher system, the elements that are tied to the integrated
information become less accessible to the higher system, consequently decreasing the
cause-effect repertoire of the higher system (and with it, decreasing its intrinsic ability to
“make differences that make a difference”).113
By limiting consciousness to the local maximum and avoiding a panpsychist conjecture,
Tononi overcomes this issue by limiting the scale of analysis to the most relevant structure.
When analyzing neural structures, this is an insight that makes IIT much more realistically
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manageable for neuroscientists. In the brain, studies have found that the cerebrum of the
brain is the only integral part of the human brain for our conscious awareness, yet the
cerebellum still provides important information to the cerebrum. In addition, the cerebellum
has a non-trivial amount of Φ, meriting the potential for consciousness even though the
cerebrum has ΦMax.114 Be that as it may, while someone can continue to exist without their
cerebellum, albeit with physical difficulties, patients with damage solely to their cerebrum
fundamentally change in personality or cease to exist as psychological person, consequently
entering a vegetative state.115 The Exclusion postulate accounts for this observation by
allowing for both entities to exist in the same neural system while having different effects on
the consciousness of the individual. Since information is maximally integrated in the
cerebrum, that part of the brain consistently contains the consciousness of the system.
To account for non-overlapping entities with non-trivial quantities of Φ, the notion of
“minor complexes” was developed.116 The relationship between major and minor complexes
from within the system is shown in Figure 7, in contrast to the overlapping concepts in
Figure 6. Tononi suggests that the “condensation into major and minor complexes may be
relevant also for much more complication systems of interconnected elements.”117 These
minor complexes, by their nature, are inaccessible to our own consciousness; though while
most psychologists would refer to these regions of the brain as “unconscious,” Tononi
prefers the term “paraconscious” since they are, in effect, minimally conscious.118 The
presence of minor complexes can explain the substantial complexity of subconscious
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processes, which are heavily theorized in psychology yet functionally indistinguishable from
conscious thoughts examined in neuroscientific studies.
By limiting consciousness to the local maximum of Φ, however, a complex cannot
operate within any other complexes, preventing the superposition of complexes. Since
Tononi knows he is conscious (and assumes all humans like him are as well), then Tononi’s
conclusion is that humans are complexes, and as such, no shared elements of humans can be
conscious.119 This implies that neurons themselves cannot be conscious, and it implies that
collectives of humans - including states - cannot be conscious.120
The Necessity of a Flexible Interpretation
In order for a state to possess experience for my argument, the Exclusion postulate must
be reinterpreted. Tononi’s interpretation relies on a few conjectures that are not
fundamentally supported, which I argue enables a more flexible approach to exclusion. The
arguments associated with these conjectures offer the potential for inaccuracies, as some are
based upon the dependence on his own personal experience, thus avoiding the inclusion of
ontologically inaccessible experiences. Additionally, circumstances such as the co-existence
of more than one major complex in any integrated society are contradictory to the notion of
exclusion, thus suggesting that the postulate is not universal.
First, as Tononi himself pointed out, this is the only postulate that relies strictly on his
own personal experience. In response to questions he received on the notion of exclusion
during his lecture at a panpsychism workshop, “It is just that my consciousness is like that,
there is only one... There might be all kinds of other stuff in the world; we are dealing with
119 “Giulio Tononi & Larissa Albantakis at ASSC18: Panpsychism Workshop (July 2014),” Youtube video, 2:16:47, posted
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consciousness and the only consciousness I know about, strictly speaking, is mine. I assume
yours is similar... Mine is always one, not a superposition.”121 Framing the argument for
exclusion in this way neglects the very nature of emergent properties. We can leave aside the
implications of solipsism in favor of more relevant inquiries; how could he determine the
instances when he is experiencing a part of a collective whole, and since Φ often fluctuates,
could he be intrinsically aware of the times that he is not “one”?
As previously established, IIT subscribes to an emergence-based view of the world, and
as such, consciousness is more than the sum of its parts. If this is the case, then each
individual mechanism that is a part of the consciousness does not internally possess its full
contribution to the whole. There is at least some contribution that cannot be accounted for
through the reflection of the self; Tononi may never have experienced what it is like to be a
collective, but that could simply imply that, as an individual, the collective is inaccessible to
him. For example, as it takes multiple neurons to process the color red, a single neuron could
never be able to understand red. There is a non-zero quantity of Φ in a neuron, so
theoretically, if separated by a vacuum from all other mechanisms, the neuron would have
ΦMax and be able to experience red. All the same, without any non-collective way to “see,”
the entire notion of color would be ontologically inaccessible to the neuron, making it
entirely impossible to have memory of red. With this logic, how could Tononi even conceive
of any one component of collective experience? A related scientific argument exemplifies
this point further on the human scale: the analysis of dimensional space. We can only
experience three dimensions of space; mathematicians can implement more than three
dimensions of space in their calculations, thus “proving” its existence, yet the closest that
121 “Giulio Tononi & Larissa Albantakis at ASSC18: Panpsychism Workshop (July 2014),” Youtube video, 2:16:47, posted
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even they can come to conceiving a 4th dimension of space is to draw various forms onto
two or three dimensional spaces.122 According to the Integration axiom of consciousness, an
experience is indivisible; therefore, the experience of a 4th dimension of space will always be
ontologically inaccessible, despite its potential existence.
Additionally, Φ is not constant through time. The only guarantee of ΦMax is that “At any
given time, you exist at that time scale” though “that time scale may actually shrink and
expand a bit.”123 An example of this is during sleep; a human brain undergoes multiple
fluctuations of integrating information, and the dreamless sleep someone “experiences” is an
example of a decrease of Φ in the cerebrum.124 Subsequently, humans are only aware of
dreamless sleep extrinsically, in that they must wake up to acknowledge that they had an
absence of experience relative to a noticeable time span. Theoretically, if a human had a
quick and steep decline of Φ that lasted for merely milliseconds, they would not notice as a
typical clock would be unhelpful and it would be unfeasible to discover something that had
occurred within that time span. Therefore, knowledge of our own fluctuations of Φ is limited
to our perception of time, and Tononi could not be intrinsically aware of all the potential
instances that he has not been “one”, either divided within his own brain or part of a larger
whole. Thus, his dependence on personal experience, due to the ontological inaccessibility
of alternative experiences, does not provide strong evidence for his current interpretation of
the Exclusion postulate.
Second, the Exclusion postulate calls into question why there is more than one major
complex in optimally macro-level systems. To extrapolate, we can refer to split brain patients
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and then to society as a whole. In split brain patients, two conscious major complexes are
created side-by-side; Tononi agrees with this assertion, positing that in these rare cases, a
system can have two major complexes rather than forcing one into becoming a minor
complex.125 Notwithstanding, since they do share a body, each half still has some residual
interactions with the other, producing a tiny non-zero quantity of Φ, and thus both remaining
in the same system. In theory, the fluctuation of Φ at unpredictable and inconsistent intervals
would imply that, at some point, one complex would have ΦMax over the other, thus making
one of them a minor complex for an undetermined period of time. Regardless, Tononi holds
that they coexist with ΦMax,126 which violates the Exclusion postulate.
Society as a whole can fit the definition of a system just as a brain does, as exemplified
in my analysis of the Existence postulate. Yet, according to the Exclusion postulate, only the
concept with ΦMax in a system can be conscious, and all others must become paraconscious.
This would imply that only one individual, confirmed as a complex, could have
consciousness in an integrated society; everyone else would cease to intrinsically exist. We
could all adopt solipsism and agree that only one of us truly exists; or, more reasonably, we
can agree that this is an error in the Exclusion postulate as it is currently applied.
ACase for the State as a Complex
The Exclusion axiom fulfills a theoretical gap in determining borders for experience,
which is essential to any theory of consciousness. Subsequently, rather than dismissing the
corresponding postulate, I will use a more flexible approach that leaves more rigorous
reevaluations of the combination problem to be theorized and tested among phenomenology
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researchers. I will assert first that institutionalized states have the potential to have ΦMax
under certain circumstances, and second, that, even as a non-major complex, it could still
have the minimal grade of experience necessary for emotion.
As previously discussed, Φ is not a constant quantity since the potential causal
interactions often change with time in any system. The possibility for individuals to lose
their ΦMax to smaller concepts during sleep simultaneously opens the possibility for
individuals to lose their ΦMax when the state theoretically “wakes up.” Due to fluctuations in
Φ in both collectives and individuals, there could feasibly be a point of time in which an
individual’s Φ decreases at the same moment that the collective’s Φ increases. Regardless of
the likelihood that it would only be sustained for an inconceivably short amount of time, the
occurrence of this phenomenon could still theoretically provide a state with an intrinsic,
collective experience. If the state is properly structured, and there is a motivation among the
population to integrate themselves within the structure, then the likelihood of this
phenomenon repeating would increase with the integration with the state, providing more
sustained experiences. From the perception of the state, time may not be evident, and thus its
experience would appear to be continuous just as our own individual experiences would
appear continuous even if they are intermittently interrupted by inconceivably small periods
of time.
Even if this phenomenon couldn’t regularly occur, states could still feasibly have a
minimal grade of experience to give rise to State Emotion. When analyzing the human brain,
the structure known as the amygdala would only qualify as a paraconscious minor complex.
Yet, it has a largely influential role in our daily lives; it has particular relevancy in this case,
often referred to as “the emotional brain.” The amygdala provokes somatic feelings in the
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body to communicate the need for a certain emotion, in turn taking feedback from the other
parts of the brain, particularly the hippocampus which processes and controls emotions.127
Additionally, the amygdala is believed to be integral in emotional recognition and emotional
memory recollection. Despite this integral role, however, the amygdala is not essential for
the whole of consciousness. Humans continue to maintain a sense of self when it is removed.
Instead, the somatic experiences of emotion are removed; and thus, many emotions such as
fear become ontologically inaccessible to these patients.128 If we can accept the notion that a
minor complex can still have enough intrinsic experience to give rise to emotions within a
brain despite not having ΦMax, then similar levels of Φ within a state could theoretically do
the same regardless of the position of the local maximum.
127 Zola‐Morgan, Stuart, Larry R. Squire, Robert P. Clower, and Pablo Alvarez‐Royo. "Independence of memory functions
and emotional behavior: separate contributions of the hippocampal formation and the amygdala." Hippocampus 1, no. 2
(1991): 207-220.
128 Maynard, James. "Want to Be Fearless? Get Rid of Amygdala Neurons in the Brain." Tech Times, November 1, 2014.
Web.
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IMPLICATIONS
Implementing the postulates of Tononi’s Integrated Information Theory into
international relations has demonstrated many state structures are causally similar to the
structures of the human brain that, through causal emergence, form the basis for individual
emotions. Although the Exclusion postulate complicates the analogous nature of this analysis,
it can be reasonably circumvented by simply establishing the potential for a state to be a
complex, as it is not necessary to empirically prove that any irrefutably are. The aim of this
analysis was not to determine whether a state’s experience is equivalent to that of a human,
or that of any other living being; rather, for the sake of the hypothesis, the burden was to
prove that a state possesses some level of experience. Indeed, I was able to establish, through
the tenets of IIT, that institutionalized states have non-zero quantities of Φ, and thus,
non-zero potential for experience.
By making this association, I can return the focus to my hypothesis: that the existence
and function of State Emotion is not from the aggregation of individuals; rather, it is a
structural process. This is established through two premises; first, that accepting
institutionalized states as distributed networks and emotion as a causally emergent
characteristic of intrinsic experience are key components to establishing the ontology of
State Emotion, and second, that conjoining the processes of experience (intrinsically
provided through IIT) with feelings (by establishing a theory of State Feeling) allows for
more explicit theorizing regarding the political function of State Emotion.
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Foundations for an Ontology of State Emotion
When Bleiker and Hutchison defined the central challenge to State Emotion, namely, “to
theorize the processes that turn individual emotions collective, social, public, and , thus,
political,” their main concern revolved around the ontological existence of State Emotion.
Mainstream theorists often question the credibility of State Emotion to explain political
behavior because it has not been physically observed or mechanically deduced; rather, it is
implied or asserted as a causal link in analyses, often when it is convenient to look at the
population as a cause for irrational decisions. This inability to directly observe the
phenomenon weakens the argument for its existence, especially since the proponents of State
Emotion cannot agree over how it ties into the nature of collectives, or even universally posit
specific traits that constrain its seemingly ethereal existence.
In light of this problem, Brent Sasley accurately asserts that “more explicit propositions
about individual-to-group emotions transference will help make theorizing about states’ (or
other group actors’) emotions more rigorous.”129 Providing an explicit ontological
foundation for its existence, thus enabling its reliable use in more rigorous frameworks, will
improve State Emotion as a tool for IR analysis; otherwise, it could feasibly be relegated to
ex machina arguments for unpredictable or irrational decisions, potentially harming rather
than expanding IR theories.
The ontological foundation that is necessary for State Emotion to advance in
mainstream IR discourse is firmly established through the implications of applying
Integrated Information Theory alongside a theory of State Feeling, in accordance to the
analysis provided in previous sections of this thesis. In summary, to establish this ontology,
129 Sasley, Brent E. "Theorizing States’ Emotions." International Studies Review. 13, no. 3 (2011): 452-476
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institutionalized states must be understood as distributed networks and emotion must be
understood as a causally emergent characteristic of intrinsic experience. Building from these
understandings, IIT establishes that any distributed network has the potential to have
experience, in that there is something it feels like to be the network. Therefore, the state as a
distributed network has the potential to have intrinsic experience. This experience is what
subsequently gives rise to State Emotion through causally emergent processes within the
context of State Feeling.
Through this line of reasoning, states certainly possess the ontological capability to have
actionable State Emotion. The explicit implementation of IIT and similar structural theories
throughout State Emotion discourse ought to become fundamental to potentially strengthen
its prevalence in mainstream IR. Although this foundation now provides a basis for rigorous
theorizing, the secondary concern in Bleiker and Hutchison’s challenge was to determine
why State Emotion is not universal; to theorize the processes that enable some collective
emotions to become political, actionable at the level of decision-making, while relegating
others to be either ineffectual or ignored. This necessitates the formation of a methodology
to determine the extent to which State Emotions apply under particular circumstances, which
must also be capable of being used under rigorous frameworks.
AConsistent Methodology for Analysis
Contextual framing is often integral to experimental methodologies in the social
sciences. Objective measures are nearly impossible to obtain without accounting for the
majority of variables, which is a substantial task when it comes to subjective phenomena
such as emotion. This is why most micro-theorists in State Emotion research opt for
analyzing historical accounts placed in context with studies in psychology. However, this
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approach is often limited and inconsistent between studies. While analyzing the context of
State Emotions in previous circumstances have yielded valuable hindsight for past state
behaviors, the current repertoire of these specialized analyses does not bring the field much
closer to finding a universal analytical framework in predicting future behaviors, especially
those that are predicated on under-theorized avenues for emotion.
The mathematical model provided by Tononi’s Integrated Information Theory provides
an uniquely explicit and rigorous methodology for State Emotion analyses. Although it is not
purely objective when applied in this context, the model still provides a fully consistent and
theoretically reliable measure that can be used for meta-analyses of IR studies in addition to
new inquiries. By focusing on the key elements necessary for the rise of experience, a better
understanding of the extent to which State Emotions drive political intentions and behaviors
can be gained from cross-study and cross-subject comparisons.
There are two contexts that should both be present at any one point of a state’s
decision-making process in order to provide an optimal account of the model’s predictability:
the level of institutionalization within the state and the freedom of the populous to express
State Feelings. The level of institutionalization alludes to the extent to which information
within the system is both integrated and differentiated. This can be accomplished either
through explicit contracts that enforce a process of multiple specialized interactions to
produce a result, or it can naturally occur as a de facto structure. For the ease of analysis,
focusing on explicit contracts, the foundations of many institutions within and including
states, are the most relevant contexts for this model’s power of predictability.
Despite its integral role, institutionalization will not yield any emotional outcomes if
there is no internalization of State Feeling. While any feelings can potentially be linked to
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decision-making, regardless of whether they originate from the populous, the leaders, or
interest groups, not all feelings can provide insight through the IIT model. Subsequently, the
most applicable circumstances for the model to provide predictability are those where State
Feelings form and are accessible to the leaders. This often requires some degree of freedom
of speech and freedom of assembly; without the ability for individuals to openly
communicate their feelings to form State Feelings and for similar individuals to join together
and demonstrate those feelings to make them accessible to the leaders of the state, then any
decisions made by the leader are independent from State Feeling. This does not require full
degrees of these freedoms; rather, simply having some capability to communicate feelings
can lead to the formation of State Feeling. The strength and prevalence of a State Feeling,
therefore, will be limited to the extent of expressive freedoms within a state.
Crawford uses the contexts of institutionalization and freedom of expression very
effectively in her analysis of fear.130 The examples that she uses to explain the effects of
collective fear in decision-making are highly institutionalized states that, although
oppressive in many respects, maintained some level of expressive freedoms that allowed the
emotions of the populous to be salient. In these contexts, Crawford could potentially use the
IIT model to provide predictions on whether or not these states will continue to make
decisions based on fear, and if so, to theorize the environmental conditions that will sway the
influence of fear under specific circumstances.
Once the contexts for the model have been established, State Emotion theorists can
proceed to apply the model. The resulting calculations can be applied for relative
determinations of State Feeling’s influence on State Emotion, which can then provide insight
130 Crawford, Neta C. “Institutionalizing Passion in World Politics: Fear and Empathy.” International Theory 6, no. 3
(2014): 535–57.
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on the underlying motivations behind certain political behaviors. The IIT model does not
calculate directly whether or not a particular decision will be made; rather, it enables
discussion on the likelihood that future decisions will be linked to State Feelings. To explain,
it is important to remember that experience has various grades rather than existing as an
absolute trait.131 Therefore, the calculations of the IIT model apply in the form of
correlations; states with lower grades of experience will have weak correlations of State
Feeling to State Emotion and Behavior while states with higher grades of experience will
have strong correlations. Correlations are used for predictions when causal linkages are
imperfect, remaining more accurate than conjecture alone yet not to be taken as absolute
certainties; therefore, the IIT model can still be considered a rigorous analytical tool.
The IIT model can also be conceptually reversed to determine which sub-mechanisms of
a state are optimally integrated - perhaps through implicit rather than explicit
institutionalization - with the state. This can be done by retroactively determining how often
particular non-state entities have translated State Feelings into behaviors; those with a
substantial record of associations can be considered to be more integrated with the
experience of a state than those with no record. Since only integrated concepts can take part
in the emergence of experience, and maximizing the integration maximizes the role of the
concept, it is clear that the frequency of associating State Feelings into behaviors, done
through the experience of the state, is limited by the integration of the entity. The potential
insights from reversing the model can be subsequently utilized for determining contexts for
future State Emotion analyses; by discovering which entities are maximally integrated, the
application of the IIT model can be optimally predictive for these entities.
131 Oizumi, Masafumi, Larissa Albantakis, and Giulio Tononi. "From the Phenomenology to the Mechanisms of
Consciousness: Integrated Information Theory 3.0." PLOS Computational Biology, 2014.
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CONCLUSION
The field of State Emotion offers many insights into the behaviors of state actors,
despite the natures of emotion and intention as attributes of persons. The ‘emotional turn’ in
IR discourse has the potential to re-conceptualize the very processes of state-level
decision-making. However, before State Emotion can be considered a reliable analytical tool,
there are multiple obstacles that must be overcome to demonstrate its core ontology.
Providing a theoretical foundation for its existence will justify the analysis of State Emotion,
the lack of which currently prevents the formation of a rigorous and consistent methodology.
The purpose of this thesis, therefore, is to address these obstacles to answer what
Bleiker and Hutchinson summarize as the central challenge to State Emotion research: to
theorize the processes that turn individual emotions collective, social, public, and , thus,
political. This challenge entails an explanation of how these emotions are manifested in
state-decisions and the need of a model for IR scholars to determine the extent of State
Emotion’s influence under particular circumstances. To satisfy this purpose, my hypothesis
proposed that the existence and function of State Emotion is not from the aggregation of
individuals; rather, it is a structural process. This was established through two premises; first,
that accepting institutionalized states as distributed networks and emotion as a causally
emergent characteristic of intrinsic experience are key components to establishing the
ontology of State Emotion, and second, that conjoining the processes of experience with
feelings allows for more explicit theorizing regarding the political function of State Emotion.
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It is with this intent that I brought the Integrated Information Theory of consciousness (IIT)
into the discussion and formulated my own theory of State Feeling.
To test this hypothesis, I first looked at the background of the pertinent theories at hand,
reflecting on the considerations for solvency, then I applied the Integrated Information
Theory to institutionalized states, and finally reflected on the implications. I established the
first premise by finding that institutionalized states met the minimal criteria for IIT’s
interpretation of a distributed network and by using the integrative embodiment theory of
emotions to assert that emotions are causally emergent from experience. I used these
assertions to develop the ontological foundation of State Emotion by logically asserting that,
as a distributed network, states have a grade of experience; subsequently, State Emotion is
causally emergent from the state’s experience. The second premise was established by
providing a theory of State Feeling, the manifestation of which can be observed, to provide a
basis for IIT’s calculations of institutionalization and influence to be rendered relevant and
explanatory in State Emotion methodologies.
Satisfying these two premises lead to the conclusion that State Emotion is, indeed, a
structural process, thus answering how these emotions are manifested in state-decisions and
providing a model to determine the extent of the process. By providing a sufficient theory to
meet this central challenge, State Emotion can be reasonably accepted as a valid analytical
tool. As a result, it is important to conclude with the direction of future research from the
implications of my research.
Opportunities for the Role of State Emotion
Among the many potential avenues of State Emotions in IR that researchers have
identified, I suggest that there are two additional opportunities for future State Emotion
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research to become a part of other discussions in IR theory, made possible by the
implications of the IIT approach. There is now the opportunity for theorists to associate
social concepts and tools, such as nationalism and network technologies, as influential
factors in a state’s decision-making process, and there is the opportunity to create a more
intuitive quantitative measure of state “failure” that could equally apply to the legitimacy of
newly formed states.
Social concepts and tools that enable the communication of individual feelings or that
encourage feelings to become collective have a new role under the IIT framework. These
concepts and tools can provide non-explicit measures of integration at the individual level,
and thus, contribute to State Emotion. For example, the effects of nationalism in foreign
policy and political psychology analyses are known to effect decision-making, and are
subsequently central to many theories in these fields.132 However, the correlation of
nationalism to state behavior fluctuates between analyses; often leaving current theories to
be circumstantial rather than universal. By suggesting that nationalism is part of a larger
measure of State Emotion, the variation in correlations can be accounted for while still
allowing for rigorous theorizing.
In addition, network analysis, particularly as it relates to the manifestation of public
opinions and feelings in social networks and communication structures133, can be tied to
State Emotion through the ways that it enables further integration. With network
technologies, physical distance is becoming less of a mediating factor in how frequently
interactions take place, and with the aide of such technologies, oftentimes more information
132 Kosterman, Rick, and Seymour Feshbach. "Toward a measure of patriotic and nationalistic attitudes." Political
Psychology (1989): 257-274.
133 Agnew, John. "The Territorial Trap: The Geographical Assumptions of International Relations Theory." Review of
International Political Economy 1, no. 1 (1994): 53-80.
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can be conveyed over shorter periods of time across a larger distribution of people. Thus,
with the increase of technology, former limitations on the level of integration within a state
will further dissipate, having a potential effect on State Emotion.
The failure of a state is an elusive concept as there is currently no consensus on its
measurement, as the notion of “legitimacy” is a matter of interpretation. While it is clear
which states have failed under extreme scenarios, such as when the government collapses,
efforts to define the initial point that tilts the scales to such extremes remains vague.
Knowing which states have failed is essential to preventing many international threats such
as terrorism and to provide humanitarian aide to where it is necessary134; as a solution, some
international organizations have developed comparative indexes based on general qualities
of a failed state. For example, the US-based Fund for Peace has established characteristics of
a “fragile” state, which all remain open to interpretation, that are used in their “Conflict
Assessment System Tool” to focus on the loss of control, authority, domestic capabilities,
and international capabilities.135 While this is by no means the “best” definition, it can
sufficiently embody what it means to fail for the purposes of understanding the insights of
State Emotion.
State Emotion under an IIT framework has relevancy over these four characteristics.
The laws of a country are part of the integration of a polity; without control over its own
territory, a government cannot maintain high levels of Φ, reducing its capability to have
State Emotion. If the authority to make decisions on behalf of the collective is dependent on
the use of State Feelings, then the loss of that authority implies that the State Emotions of
the state are no longer tied to the collective. Domestic policies, such as public services, are
134 Rotberg, Robert I. "Failed States in a World of Terror." Council on Foreign Relations, July/August 2002. Web.
135 Stepputat, Finn, and Lars Engberg-Pedersen. "II. Fragile States: Definitions, Measurements and Processes." Fragile
Situations: Background Papers. Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies (2008): 21-31.
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necessary to sustain the polity’s motivation to remain integrated with the state, and the
inability to provide such services directly impacts the quality of State Emotion. Finally,
assuming that State Emotion is the means by which states interact with others in the
international community, the loss of the first three characteristics would impact the state’s
international capabilities as well.
Therefore, the “failure” of a state could be seen as the loss of its capability to sustain the
State Emotion from its constituents. This insight allows for the calculation of State Emotion,
or the quantity of Φ, to serve as an analytical tool to determine the failure of a state: low
levels of Φ are more likely to fail than high levels of Φ. This can be reversed to also
determine the legitimacy of new states, such as Taiwan or the European Union, through the
Exclusion postulate; if ΦMax (the local maximum of integration) within a territory belongs to
the new state rather than the original state, then the capability to sustain the population’s
State Emotion can only exist in the new state, confirming its legitimacy. On the other hand,
if ΦMax remains attributed to the original state, then the entity challenging its position would
merely qualify as a paraconscious mechanism.
Limitations in Future Research
While the IIT approach to State Emotion provides many benefits and enables greater
freedom for theorizing, a few limitations remain that affect the nature of future research.
Though these limitations do not necessarily restrict the use of IIT, they do pose substantial
challenges for determining fully accurate calculations of Φ, allowing for a reasonable chance
of error in comparative observations. The complexity of the IIT and the accountability for
variables impose those limitations.
The limitation of the complexity of IIT is posited by Tononi himself. To account for
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every possible interaction in every possible circumstance between neurons would be an
immensely complicated evaluation; so complicated, in fact, that such a methodology is
currently inaccessible in regards to any scientific or computational capabilities.136 This
situation is similar in the evaluation of states; we cannot even feasibly account for every
single individual interaction as it relates to a single behavior, let alone every possible
interaction under every possible circumstance. As a result, the true value of Φ can never be
accurately calculated in either neuroscientific pursuits or IR inquiries. Howbeit, this
limitation does not prevent the use of the theory; although the true value of Φ is inaccessible,
estimations can still bring comparable insights into the relationships within and between
states.
In addition, the accountability for variables brings forth a similar limitation. Separating
the elements that are the core causes within concepts from the ones that are merely variables
cannot be objectively determined. Theoretically, every mechanism that influences the
outcome would be part of the calculation; in practice, since the true Φ requires too much
evaluation, the evaluation of causal mechanisms must be prioritized to focus most on the
ones that make the most differences. This consequently leaves the calculation up to a small
degree of interpretation, as there may not be a consensus on the ranking of every certain
causal mechanisms in these analyses. This limitation requires that future research specifies
which causal mechanisms are included in each analysis in order to maintain the analytical
consistency between studies and validate cross-study evaluations.
136 Oizumi, Masafumi, Larissa Albantakis, and Giulio Tononi. "From the Phenomenology to the Mechanisms of
Consciousness: Integrated Information Theory 3.0." PLOS Computational Biology, 2014.
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